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Abstract
Prospective memory is the ability to remember and act upon future intentions. In the
context of daily life, prospective memory intentions can be either self-interested or pro-socially
motivated (such as remembering to pay a credit card bill or buy a gift for a friend, respectively).
Research suggests that individuals place greater importance on their performance of prosocial
intentions rather than self-interested intentions, and a pro-social advantage has been observed in
prospective memory. I investigated the role of motivation in prospective memory and a person’s
belief about their cognitive abilities (i.e., metacognition) in regard to prospective memory. The
present study used an eye-tracking paradigm in which participants were engaged in an ongoing
visual search task, with a prospective memory task embedded into the trail. Participants’
motivational state was manipulated through a monetary incentive, and they also made
predictions and postdictions about their performance on the prospective memory and ongoing
tasks as a proxy for metacognition. I found a trend for a prosocial advantage to prospective
memory performance and metacognitive awareness, and a tendency of neutral motivational states
in reducing cognitive effort in prospective memory target monitoring. Such trends were not
observed in the self-interested motivational state.
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The Effects of Motivational States on Metacognition and Prospective Memory
Prospective memory, as defined by Einstein & McDaniel (1990), is the ability to
remember and act upon future intentions. In the context of daily life, prospective memory
intentions can be either self-interested or altruistically motivated (Brandimonte, Ferrante,
Bianco, & Villani 2010). An example of a self-interested prospective memory task is
remembering to order dessert for yourself the next time the waitress stops by your table, while an
example of an altruistic, or ‘prosocial’ prospective memory task is remembering to complete
your part of a group project before midnight. Previous research suggests a prosocial advantage in
remembering to execute previously-formed intentions when compared to self-interested
incentives or no incentives (Brandimonte & Ferrante, 2015; Brandimonte et al., 2010). In
addition, Penningroth, Scott, & Freuen (2011) found that individuals consider their performance
of prosocial prospective memory intentions to be much more important than their performance of
self-interested prospective memory intentions. In these ways, researchers have used motivational
states to manipulate the perceived importance of prospective memory tasks, in hopes of altering
prospective memory performance in laboratory settings.
Effects of motivation on prospective memory performance can also be seen through
ongoing task costs – or how much cognitive effort is averted to a simultaneous continuing task.
These costs are traditionally measured by comparing reaction times to complete an ongoing task
between a control block (comprising of only the ongoing task) and an experimental block
(comprising of both an ongoing task and a prospective memory intention). By comparing
reaction times across motivational states in a prospective memory task, researchers can
determine if different incentives influence the allocation of cognitive effort on the ongoing task.
In previous research, reaction time has been quicker in groups with purely prosocial incentives;
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however, the reaction time of groups with an additional self-interested monetary incentive
slowed (Brandimonte & Ferrante, 2015; Brandimonte et al., 2010). This suggests that selfinterested intentions require cognitively demanding overt monitoring of the prospective memory
target, thus causing slow-downs in the ongoing task performance (Smith, 2003). Meanwhile, the
cognitive processes behind prosocial intentions seem to function more automatically (Bargh et
al., 1996), possibly as a result of spontaneous retrieval, the sudden retrieval of a previouslyformed intention (McDaniel & Einstein, 2000; Scullin et al., 2013).
In addition to motivation, metacognition – which is the way in which people think about
their own mental processes – can also alter prospective memory performance. Schnitzspahn,
Zeintl, Jäger, & Kliegel (2011) observed that prospective memory performance predictions were
correlated with their actual performance, suggesting that metacognition for prospective memory
tasks is moderately accurate. Furthermore, the use of performance predictions and metacognition
has been shown to improve prospective memory task performance (Meier, von Wartburg, Matter,
Rothen, & Reber 2011). In contrast, Bianchi et al. (2017) studied participant’s prediction of
prospective memory performance and found participants to be overconfident in their predicted
performance in a naturalistic setting, regardless of motivational states. These inconsistencies
reveal how the study of influences of metacognition on prospective memory has the potential to
be investigated further – particularly the investigation of how motivational states influence
people’s metacognition in service of prospective remembering.
Hacker et al. (2018) explored the effects of different motivational states on prospective
memory task performance along with metacognition and was the first in this line of research to
use an eye-tracker. In comparison to measures of reaction time, the novel eye-tracking approach
used by Hacker et al. (2018) enabled a more direct assessment of the ongoing task cost by
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allowing researchers to observe overt monitoring for the prospective memory target. The study
used monetary incentive to promote prosocial ($25 to charity), self-interested ($25 to self), or
neutral (no monetary incentive) motivational states. Participants engaged in an ongoing visual
search task in which they counted the number of living objects within an array of images.
Participants were given the prospective memory task of responding to a particular image that
appeared in a separate region of the screen. Participants first completed a control block of the
visual search task without a prospective memory demand. Following the control block,
participants engaged in a video viewing task that consisted of condition-specific videos. For
example, in the pro-social condition, participants watched a video about the benefits of giving to
charity. After, participants completed the experimental block of the visual search task, which
included the prospective memory intention to respond to a particular image that appeared in a
separate region of the screen. Each block consisted of 44 trials, each lasting 12 seconds.
Additionally, the prospective memory image, located outside of the main visual array in the
upper right-hand corner of the screen changed every 4-second, making three subtrials per trial.
Results from Hacker et al. (2018) found that prospective memory performance was not
affected by motivational states – however, participants were underconfident in their performance.
Furthermore, those in the self-interested condition more accurately predicted their performance,
while those in the prosocial condition more accurately postdicted their performance. These
results suggest that metacognitive awareness of prospective memory performance can be
influenced by motivational states in the form of monetary incentives, however, the researchers
observed ceiling effects. Participant accuracy in the prospective memory task was consistently
high.
It is possible that the items in the delay interval (a demographic questionnaire and a
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context-priming video) did not capture focused or sustained attention, allowing participants to
internally rehearse the prospective memory instructions, thus improving their accuracy (Martin,
Brown, & Hicks 2011). It is also possible that both the ongoing and prospective memory tasks
were too slow and simple, promoting constant monitoring of the prospective memory target
region. To account for these potential confounds, I used the same eye-tracking paradigm to
explore this important research question while implementing a task with a higher cognitive load
during the delay interval (e.g. a verbal fluency test) to prevent intention rehearsal. In addition, I
increased the speed of the ongoing task to allocate attention away from the prospective memory
target region.
There is relatively little literature on the effects of motivation and metacognition on
successful prospective memory performance. Filling in these gaps may have important
theoretical implications, such as further advancing prospective memory research in regard to the
use of an eye-tracker as a proxy for prospective memory target monitoring. My study
hypothesized that prospective memory performance would be highest in the prosocial condition
and that changes to the experiment would reduce previously observed ceiling effects.
Methodology
Participants and Design
Participants were undergraduate students from the University of Tennessee at
Chattanooga (n=37), and they were recruited through the UTC SONA system. The study
implemented a 2 X 2 X 3 mixed-factor design, with counterbalancing target images (horse/chair)
as a 2-level between-participants factor, incentive type (control/self-interested/prosocial) as the
3-leveled between-participants factor, and block (control/prospective memory) as a two-level
within-participants factor.
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Materials
Apparatus: Data were collected using a Sensomotoric Instruments (SMI) Red-250
mobile eye-tracker with a gaze position accuracy of 0.4˚ and a spatial resolution of 0.03˚.
Fixation points were defined as lingering for .150s I a 30-pixel diameter and were used to
measure gaze patterns and target region monitoring. This device obtained data involving eye
movements and the participants’ monitoring of the prospective memory target region of the
screen. The EyeWorks eye 14 tracking software allowed for programming and data collection of
the task.
Condition-Specific Script: Between the control and experimental block, participants
were told of the prospective memory task, target image, and monetary incentive with a
condition-specific script (see Appendix A). Participants in the prosocial condition were
incentivized with a chance to win $25 for a charity of their choice, while participants in the selfinterested condition were incentivized with a chance to win a $25 gift card for themselves. Those
in the standard condition were not given a monetary incentive.
Ongoing Task: Participants were shown an array of images lasting for 9 seconds before
automatically changing to the next trial. The images were either photographs or graphic images
of easily identifiable living and nonliving objects. They were obtained from several open-source
websites including openclipart.org, pixabay.com, and clker.com (see Figure 1).
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Figure 1. Example of ongoing task/prospective memory target region array.
Prospective Memory Task: The prospective memory target region appeared in the upper
right-hand corner of the screen, which participants needed to monitor for a prospective memory
target image. As a counterbalancing measure, this image was either a chair or a horse. The image
in the top right corner changed more rapidly, with 3 sub-trials lasting 3 seconds per trial.
Delay Task: Participants completed a delay task that consisted of 3 verbal fluency trials
lasting one minute each, using the letters F, A, and S. The purpose of this delay task was to create
temporal distance between the prospective memory task instruction and the completion of the
prospective memory task.
Metacognition Survey: Embedded throughout the experiment were opportunities for
participants to report their awareness of their own mental processes. Before the delay task,
participants were given an encoding check to ensure that they understood the task instruction as
well as the incentive that they were told about in their condition-specific scripts. At this time,
they were also asked predictive questions (On a scale from 1-100, how well do you think you
will do in this memory task? On a scale from 1-100, how well do you think you will do in the
living object count task?) as well as questions signifying how important they thought each of
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these tasks were. At the end of the experiment, participants were asked postdictive questions (On
a scale from 1-100, how well do you think you did in this memory task? On a scale from 1-100,
how well do you think you did in the living object count task?) as well as qualitative questions
regarding their monitoring strategies (What strategies did you use to remember to click the left
mouse button when an image of the [chair/horse] appeared?).
Procedure
Participation in this study consisted of a single session in the Cognitive Aging, Learning,
and Memory (CALM) lab, which lasted for approximately 1 hour. The study required the
participants to sit at a computer, and a mounted eye-tracker recorded gaze data. The participants
were randomly assigned to one of six groups, differing on the prospective memory target
(chair/horse) and incentive type (control/self-interested/prosocial). Upon arrival, participants
signed an informed consent that explained their condition-specific incentives for this experiment
– for example, the incentive for the prosocial condition was in the form of a $25 donation to a
charity, the incentive in the self-interested condition was in the form of a $25 gift card, and there
was no incentive for the control group. Participants then completed a demographic questionnaire.
With the eye-tracker apparatus, participants began a control block, which consisted of 44
trials, each with an array of images that changed every 9 seconds. The participants were told to
count and report the number of living objects in each 9-second trial. The control block included
the mechanism for the prospective memory task, 3-second-long sub-trials of a separate target
region in a corner of the screen, but the participants were not made aware of its significance.
After the control block, participants were given instructions for the prospective memory
task – to click the left mouse button when an image of a chair or horse appeared in the top righthand corner of the screen – and were reminded of their incentives through a condition-specific
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script. This was followed by an encoding check to ensure their understanding of the task, as well
as a metacognition questionnaire to allow the participants to predict their accuracy in the
prospective memory performance. Next, as a delay task, participants completed 3 trials of a
verbal fluency task, where they had 60 seconds to list words that begin with a specific letter. The
purpose of this high-cognitive-load task was to distract the participants from the prospective
memory instructions.
Once the verbal fluency task was complete, participants began the experimental block.
They were not reminded of the prospective memory task instructions at this time. The
experimental block consisted of another 44 trials. Consistent with the control block, each trial
lasted 9 seconds with 3-second subtrials of the prospective memory target region. Participants
completed the same ongoing task of counting and reporting the number of living objects, with
the additional prospective memory task of clicking the right mouse button when the target image
appeared in the target region of the screen.
Next, the participants answered more metacognition questions to postdict their
prospective memory task accuracy. The participants also completed a retrospective memory task,
to ensure that they retained an understanding of the prospective memory instructions. Finally,
participants were verbally debriefed and dismissed.
Results
Due to an eye-tracker malfunction, testing had to be stopped before attaining the required
sample. For this reason, I will focus on descriptive statistics rather than inferential statistics.
Prospective Memory
I operationalized prospective memory performance as the percentage of correct responses
out of four possible targets. Prospective memory task performance averages were equally high
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across conditions: standard M = 75.0%, SE = 4.65, 95% CI [56.1, 93.9], prosocial M = 81.3%,
SE = 5.7, 95% CI [58.2, 104.3], and self-interested M = 76.6%, SE = 4.0, 95% CI [56.1, 93.9]
(see Figure 2).
Metacognition
I operationalized prospective memory performance prediction using a self-reported
response on a scale from 1-100. Prospective memory task performance prediction averages were
equally high across conditions: standard M = 72.0%, SE = 5.4, 95% CI [61.0, 83.0], prosocial M
= 76.8%, SE = 6.6, 95% CI [63.2, 90.2], and self-interested M = 70.9%, SE = 4.7, 95%, CI [61.3,
80.5] (see Figure 2). I operationalized prospective memory performance postdiction using a selfreported response on a scale from 1-100. Prospective memory task performance postdiction
averages differ across conditions: standard M = 68.30%, SE = 4.6, 95% CI [58.9, 77.8], prosocial
M = 79.1%, SE = 5.7, 95% CI [67.6, 10.7], and self-interested M = 84.2%, SE = 4.0, 95% CI
[76.2, 92.6] (see Figure 2).

Figure 2. Metacognitive awareness and prospective memory performance side-by-side.
Monitoring
I operationalized monitoring as total gaze fixations in the prospective memory target

MOTIVATION, METACOGNITION, AND PROSPECTIVE MEMORY

13

region across all trials within each task block, which represented how often participants
monitored for the prospective memory target. Monitoring was observed in the experimental
block where there were significantly higher fixations; standard M = 54.25, SE = 12.65, 95% CI
[28.51, 80.00], prosocial M = 100.50, SE = 15.50, 95% CI [68.97, 103.03], and self-interested M
= 87.25, SE = 10.96, 95%, CI [64.96, 109.54]. Comparatively, the control block experienced
very few fixations; standard M = 11.8, SE = 4.60, 95% CI [2.48, 21.19], prosocial M = 4.12, SE
= 5.63, 95% CI [-7.33, 15.58], and self-interested M = 3.98, SE = .017, 95% CI [-2.35, 13.85]
(see Figure 3).

Figure 3. Prospective memory target monitoring by condition between the task blocks.
Ongoing Task
I operationalized ongoing task accuracy as the degree to which a participant’s response
was correct, calculated by how many digits a response differed from the correct number of living
objects across 44 trials in each block, inverted and shown as a percent. In the control block,
standard M = 88.1%, SE = .02, 95% CI [83.7, 92.4], prosocial M = 94.7%, SE = .026, 95% CI
[89.3, 100.1], and self-interested M = 89.4%, SE = .017, 95% CI [85.6, 93.2]. In the
experimental block, standard M = 86.9%, SE = .029, 95% CI [80.9, 92.8], prosocial M = 92.1%,
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SE = .036, 95% CI [84.8, 99.4], and self-interested M = 88.1%, SE = .025, 95%, CI [82.9, 93.2]
(see Figure 4).

Figure 4. Ongoing task performance by condition.
Comparison of Hacker at al. (2018) and present study
I measured the effects of the altered methodology on the ceiling effects observed in
Hacker et al. (2018) by comparing the means of prospective memory performance across
conditions in both studies. The performance in Hacker et al. was higher in every condition:
standard M = 89.4%, SE = 5.6, 95% CI [78.5, 100.30], prosocial M = 89.0%, SE = 5.5, 95% CI
[77.9, 100.10], and self-interested M = 83.0%, SE = 5.6, 95% CI [71.9, 94.1]. In every condition,
I observed lower prospective memory performance accuracy: standard M = 75.0%, SE = 4.65,
95% CI [56.1, 93.9], prosocial M = 81.3%, SE = 5.7, 95% CI [58.2, 104.3], and self-interested M
= 76.6%, SE = 4.0, 95% CI [56.1, 93.9].
I calculated inferential statistics using a univariate general linear model, with the withinparticipants factor being performance and the between-participants factors being the condition
and the experiment. There was no main effect of experiment, F(1,110) = 1.782, p = 0.185 (see
Figure 5).
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Figure 5. Prospective memory performance accuracy by condition between experiments.
Discussion
Consistent with previous studies (Brandimonte & Ferrante, 2015; Brandimonte et al.,
2010; Penningroth, Scott, & Freuen 2011), participants who were given a prosocial incentive had
higher prospective memory performance. This trend supports the suggestion made by Bargh,
Chen, & Burrows (1996) that prosocial intentions function more automatically in prospective
memory tasks. These results offer more evidence in favor of the process of spontaneous retrieval
in prospective memory.
While prospective memory performance was relatively high in all three conditions, I was
successful in reducing the high prospective memory performance found in Hacker et al. (2018).
When compared to Hacker et al. 2018, the present study saw a decrease in prospective memory
performance, suggesting that the decrease in trial time and the use of a verbal fluency test as a
delay task successfully reduced ceiling effects. It is suggested that the decrease in trial time
increased the difficulty of the task and the delay task required a higher cognitive load to
complete.
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Regardless of condition, participants were relatively accurate in predicting and
postdicting their performance in the prospective memory task, although there was a slight trend
for higher metacognitive accuracy in the prosocial condition than the self-interested or standard
conditions. More research must be done to investigate the nature of this relationship, as well as to
examine the mechanisms that underly it.
The present study observed high monitoring of the prospective memory target region in
the incentivized conditions (prosocial and self-interested), with lower monitoring observed in the
standard unincentivized condition. This trend suggests that a neutral motivational state leads to a
lower allocation of attention in the prospective memory target region, which has been attributed
to lower motivation to complete the prospective memory task successfully, due to a lack of
incentive. This outcome appears to be inconsistent with the theory of spontaneous retrieval, as it
suggests that prosocial motivation does rely on monitoring rather than a more automatic retrieval
process. I propose that prosocial motivation could use a more automatic retrieval process, such as
spontaneous retrieval, in using covert monitoring rather than overt monitoring. This requires
future investigation. Furthermore, these results could also be a result of the study’s small sample
size, and the methods should be replicated in future studies with a larger sample.
Future studies could attempt to reduce the limitations of my research, such as low
participant numbers. In addition, future studies could use this paradigm to further examine this
apparent advantage of prosocial motivation on prospective memory performance without
experiencing ceiling effects found in previous research. They could also use this eye-tracking
paradigm to research other factors, such as emotional states, in relation to prospective memory.
In summary, my study extends previous research involving the effects of motivational
states on prospective memory and metacognition, as well as the use of an eye-tracking paradigm
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as a more direct assessment of prospective memory task monitoring. Consistent with previous
research, the present study suggests a prosocial advantage in prospective memory that has been
attributed to a more automatic system of remembering, such as spontaneous retrieval. The
present study also informs prospective memory literature by demonstrating the use of a verbal
fluency test as an effective delay task between prospective memory task instruction and
completion. The information in the present study and subsequent lines of research might assist
individuals, both in the general population and those with cognitive impairments (e.g.
Alzheimer’s disease) in developing more efficient prospective memory strategies in their daily
lives.
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Appendix A
Condition-Specific Scripts
Standard script: “In the next phase of the experiment, in addition to counting the number of
living objects, we are particularly interested in how well you remember to respond to particular
items you will encounter in this task. A new image will appear every four seconds in the top right
corner of the screen during each trial. Whenever you see a [chair/horse] appear in the top right
corner, you should click the left mouse button. The [chair/horse] will rarely appear but it will
appear more than once over the course of the experiment. Remember, you do not need to include
images in the top right corner in your living object count; however, you should click the left
mouse button whenever you see a [chair/horse] in the top right corner.”
Pro-social script: “In the next phase of the experiment, in addition to counting the number of
living objects, we are particularly interested in how well you remember to respond to particular
items you will encounter in this task. A new image will appear every four seconds in the top right
corner of the screen during each trial. Whenever you see a [chair/horse] appear in the top right
corner, you should click the left mouse button. The [chair/horse] will rarely appear but it will
appear more than once over the course of the experiment. Remember, you do not need to include
images in the top right corner in your living object count; however, you should click the left
mouse button whenever you see a [chair/horse] in the top right corner.
“You will be competing with other participants to win a $25 donation to a non-profit
charity. Each time that you remember to click the left mouse button when an image of a
[chair/horse] appears in the top right corner of the screen, you will earn a lottery ticket. At the
end of the study, we will draw lottery tickets and 25% of participants will earn a $25 donation to
a non-profit charity. For example, if 100 people complete the study, we will draw lottery tickets
for 25 winners. Thus, the more times you remember to perform this memory task, the more
lottery tickets you will earn and the better your chance will be of winning this incentive.”
Self-interested script: “In the next phase of the experiment, in addition to counting the number
of living objects, we are particularly interested in how well you remember to respond to
particular items you will encounter in this task. A new image will appear every four seconds in
the top right corner of the screen during each trial. Whenever you see a [chair/horse] appear in
the top right corner, you should click the left mouse button. The [chair/horse] will rarely appear
but it will appear more than once over the course of the experiment. Remember, you do not need
to include images in the top right corner in your living object count; however, you should click
the left mouse button whenever you see a [chair/horse] in the top right corner.
“You will be competing with other participants to win a $25 Amazon gift card. Each time
that you remember to click the left mouse button when an image of a [chair/horse] appears in the
top right corner of the screen, you will earn a lottery ticket. At the end of the study, we will draw
lottery tickets and 25% of participants will earn a $25 Amazon gift card. For example, if 100
people complete the study, we will draw lottery tickets for 25 winners. Thus, the more times you
remember to perform this memory task, the more lottery tickets you will earn and the better your
chance will be of winning this incentive.”
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